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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am honored to be here, and I thank the members of the Committee for their support of our Armed Forces in the field and the ongoing relief and recovery efforts in Iraq.

Before the President made the decision to use force to end Saddam Hussein's regime, officials throughout the government engaged in careful planning to address humanitarian, civil-military, and reconstruction issues related to such an endeavor. These officials and their leaders realized that even a decisive military victory would ultimately be compromised, if humanitarian issues were not adequately addressed. The subsequent planning effort drew on lessons learned from recent experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. At the same time, the planning effort recognized that Iraq represented a unique situation in terms of U.S. national objectives, culture, and Saddam's legacy of oppression.

United States Government planning for relief and reconstruction was conducted by an interagency coordinating committee, which reported to a committee of the deputies of the various departmental units. Furthermore, the coordinating committee appointed a humanitarian planning team of experts to work with the United States Central Command to ensure that relief and reconstruction plans were synchronized with our war plans. The coordinating committee conducted extensive outreach with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, regional allies, and other actors to develop a comprehensive humanitarian relief plan for Iraq. This provisional plan -- approved by the President well before conflict began -- focused on six general principles:

- **Effective interagency coordination,**
- **Protection of humanitarian infrastructure and minimization of the disruption of civilian life,**
- **US government and international stockpiling of relief supplies,**
- **Facilitation and funding of UN agencies and NGOs,**

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- **Effective civil-military coordination, and**
- **Preparation for the resumption of the public distribution system for food and medicines.**

As a result of careful planning and the skill and professionalism of our combat forces, the widely-predicted humanitarian crisis in Iraq was averted. There has been no food crisis, no widespread outbreaks of disease, no systematic human rights abuses, no significant ethnic reprisals, no large-scale population displacements, and no destabilization of states in the region.

The initial interagency planning allowed Lt. General (ret.) Jay Garner and his team, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), to begin focusing on the early stages of recovery and reconstruction. The ORHA team grew in just a few weeks from a small headquarters-planning cell in Washington to an interagency team of hundreds of dedicated professionals.

General Garner identified the initial critical tasks essential for establishing success in Iraq. He populated his team with a range of experts from across the U.S. Government and built on the existing civil-military coordination mechanisms and the established relationships with international and non-governmental organizations to further his objectives. By the time General Garner turned the reins over to Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, he had established palpable momentum on relief and recovery activities.

Following Garner's successful start, Ambassador Bremer developed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) into a large-scale interagency team with representation from a myriad of agencies and organizations, now spread throughout Iraq. Ambassador Bremer enjoys the support of representatives from several Coalition nations and benefits from productive relationships with international and non-governmental organizations.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 provided international recognition of the CPA and defined the role of the United Nations in Iraq's reconstruction. Ambassador Bremer coordinates closely with the UN Special Representative for Iraq, Mr. Sergio de Mello, and both leaders have exchanged liaison officers.

In all, Ambassador Bremer has maintained the positive momentum on General Garner's critical near-term tasks and has made great progress on CPA goals:

- The leading CPA priority remains security. Recovery efforts in Iraq will not flourish until a secure and stable environment is established and considerable effort has been focused on this task. Daily progress is evident

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on many fronts: reformation and reconstitution of the Iraqi Police Force, training of ministry and facility protection forces, establishment of an international stabilization force, and creation of a New Iraqi Army.

- A second critical priority is rapid improvement in the quality of life of the Iraqi people through the restoration of basic services. Much has been accomplished in the areas of food delivery, health, power, water, and sanitation. Much remains to be done, especially in regards to the Iraqi electrical system.
- A third critical priority is to maximize international contributions to Iraq's recovery. Many countries have already contributed to this effort through military, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction assistance, and financial contributions. A fall donor's conference will further energize international contributions.
- Economic development is a fourth priority and the CPA is enacting a number of promising initiatives in this area. The recently approved budget for the remainder of 2003 is a significant step forward, as are the planned currency reform and infrastructure investment projects.
- Finally, Iraqi self-government is the ultimate goal in Iraq. Progress is evident on this front at the local, ministerial, and national levels. The recent establishment of the Governing Council of Iraq is a significant milestone, to be followed by a constitutional development process, and, in time, national elections, leading to a democratically-elected government for a free Iraq.

With regard to international organizations and non-governmental organizations, the U.S. Government (USG) recognized even before the conflict began that it could not "go it alone" with regard to relief and recovery activities in Iraq. Consequently, the USG engaged in significant outreach efforts to facilitate the preparation of these organizations and established multiple liaison and civil-military coordination activities, as well as a pre-war humanitarian mapping effort. A particularly successful effort in this area was the establishment, with the Kuwaiti Government, of a Humanitarian Operations Center in Kuwait to facilitate information-sharing and planning.

With regard to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), it must be recognized that this is a very heterogeneous set of entities. Many NGOs, such as those testifying here today, are extraordinarily capable. While most NGOs have interests that are congruent with US interests, a few NGOs lack transparency and accountability, and a few NGOs even hide behind their humanitarian cover to

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further illegitimate interests. We applaud Administrator Natsios' efforts at USAID to increase accountability of NGOs receiving US funds and to link US-funded NGO efforts to US interests. DoD will continue to work with our interagency colleagues to foster effective civil-military coordination with appropriate NGOs. The Department of State remains the lead U.S. agency for NGO-related activities.

In conclusion, careful interagency planning and cooperation combined with the skill and professionalism of our combat forces helped avert a humanitarian crisis in Iraq and laid the groundwork for General Garner to quickly establish positive momentum on humanitarian relief and recovery activities. Ambassador Bremer has been able to build on his predecessor's efforts to expand Coalition reconstruction efforts. In the pre-crisis, combat, and stabilization phases of this operation, interagency and international cooperation in Washington and in the field has been excellent. Significant progress is being made in Iraq, but much remains to be done.