

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Chairman
Room B-372 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Tel: 202 225-2548
Fax: 202 225-2382
E-mail: hr.groc@mail.house.gov

Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays March 9, 2004

Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) pose a growing threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad. Available, affordable and versatile, these technologies offer rogue nations and sub-state actors access to strategic capabilities previously beyond their reach. The burgeoning global marketplace of military and commercial systems means our battlefield and homeland defenses will face profound challenges from the thick catalogue of pilotless machines some call “the poor man’s air force.”

According to the Congressional Research Service, as of last year 161 UAV production programs operated in 50 nations. The arsenals of 75 nations currently contain 131 different types of cruise missiles. By one estimate, an enemy with \$50 million to spend could buy just one or two advanced tactical fighters, fifteen ballistic missiles, or 100 off the shelf, ready to fire cruise missiles each carrying a substantial conventional explosive payload. Slower and smaller UAV systems, from model airplanes to GPS-enabled rotary wing craft, can be effective purveyors of chemical or biological weapons. A standard-sized cargo container on the deck of a freighter approaching our coast could conceal a cruise missile and launcher.

Numerous commercial UAV applications, and the ready availability of dual-use components like guidance systems, make controlling the spread of sensitive technologies extremely difficult. Many of the systems sought by proliferators literally and figuratively fly under the defensive radars arrayed against them. To prove the point, a New Zealander, with only limited aerospace expertise, was able to obtain all the components needed to build a homemade cruise missile last year. He apparently broke no laws while procuring an airframe, propulsion plant, and guidance and control systems for less than \$5000.

The dimensions of this rapidly emerging threat compel us to ask: What is being done to keep these lethal technologies from falling into the wrong hands? Are Cold War-era counter proliferation strategies focused on system range and payload limits relevant against a post-9/11 threat characterized by rapid technological innovation, miniaturization, and a highly adaptable enemy? Do national and international export control regimes effectively limit the flow of the most advanced components that define our current technological advantage in the cruise missile and UAV fields?

To help us address these issues, we asked the General Accounting Office to assess international counter-proliferation efforts and evaluate U.S. programs to verify that UAV and cruise missile technology exports are used as intended. The GAO findings, released last week, point to gaps in export license reviews and post-shipment monitoring. GAO recommends far more aggressive use of end-use verification and inspections by the Departments of Commerce, Defense and State.

We will hear testimony this afternoon from two panels of experts. The first will describe the scope of the problem. The second panel will discuss the complex international and interagency export control processes used to limit the diversion of critical UAV and cruise missile technologies. We appreciate the experience and insight all our witnesses bring to our oversight of these issues, and we look forward to their testimony.